

SECRET - EXDISSALT TWO I  
SESSION  
A. 111MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
U.S. SALT DELEGATION  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: December 18, 1972

TIME: 7:00 - 8:00 p.m.

PLACE: U.S. Ambassador's  
Residence, Geneva

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Dr. Edward M. Ifft

Mr. M. P. Shelepin

Mr. Shelepin initiated the conversation by saying the Soviet side was disappointed that the U.S. had been so general in its presentations during this session. The Soviet Delegation had given a number of concrete proposals and had been prepared for detailed negotiations, but had found the U.S. Delegation unprepared for such an exchange. He hoped that the U.S. would return in February ready for concrete, detailed negotiations.

I acknowledged that the U.S. side had, for the most part, been rather general in its presentations. We viewed this short initial session as preparatory, and I was sure that the sides would be engaging in greater specificity in the next round. Nevertheless, the situation had not been entirely as he described it. For example, the U.S. had presented some concrete ideas, such as equal aggregates and equal ceilings on ICBM throw-weight, while the Soviet side had been quite vague in presenting its new concept of restraint. Shelepin replied that U.S. presentations on throw-weight had not been all that specific. As far as restraint was concerned, the Soviet side had introduced the concept and was awaiting a U.S. response.

I asked Shelepin if the Soviet side was no longer interested in aggregates, a concept the sides had agreed on earlier. He replied that they were still interested. The fundamental difference between the sides is, as it has been all along, that the U.S. is interested in a three-component aggregate, while the Soviets believe there should be four components. The fourth is FBS, of course. He then went through a detailed rationale for why FBS must be taken into account, but without defending current Soviet proposals on FBS. He conceded that the problem was a very complicated one brought about by geographical asymmetries. He also agreed with me that the problem was primarily political rather than strategic. However, he said if the USSR should agree to

SECRET - EXDIS

State Department review

SECRET - EXDIS

-2-

all the U.S. proposals, the 7,000 U.S. nuclear warheads in Western Europe (to quote a U.S. number) would put the USSR at a considerable disadvantage.

I asked Shelepin if the Soviet side was prepared to discuss Soviet non-central systems as well. He said Soviet non-central systems have only one "function"--to threaten U.S. Allies. U.S. non-central systems, on the other hand, have two functions--to threat Soviet Allies and also to threaten the USSR itself. I disagreed. Shelepin went on to say that his delegation had been discussing the U.S. claim, raised again in the morning plenary, that Soviet medium bombers could strike the U.S. The Soviets could not understand this claim. Such strikes would be possible only on one-way "kamikaze" missions. I said that I did not believe that Soviet non-central systems had as their primary mission threatening the U.S. However, if one argued in terms of capability rather than intent, as the Soviets always did for U.S. FBS, then such Soviet systems must be included. Shelepin, who seemed surprisingly relaxed on the subject of Soviet non-central systems throughout the conversation, then said that if the U.S. was ready to discuss FBS, the Soviet side was ready to consider all aspects of the problem and to conduct a two-way negotiation.

I asked Shelepin if he wanted to return to the next phase of SALT. He replied that he frankly would rather transfer to the MBFR area, but this had not yet proved possible. I then recalled a conversation we once had in Vienna in which he had expressed the view that FBS might more properly be considered in MBFR than in SALT, and asked if his view on this remained the same. He said he remembered the conversation and that he would not exclude the possibility that FBS might better be dealt with in MBFR.

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SECRET - EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

SALT TWO  
SESSION I  
A-110

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
U.S. SALT DELEGATION  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: December 18, 1972  
TIME: 7:45 p.m. to 8:15 p.m.  
PLACE: American Ambassador's  
Residence, Geneva

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff

Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov  
Mr. O. A. Grinevsky

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US Statement on FBS

Semenov criticized the hard and polemical tone of the US statement on FBS delivered that morning. I said it was not polemical, and was simply a clear and straightforward statement of the US view on the subject. I argued that it was helpful to be clear and frank when views differed. Semenov said he was not objecting to the US expressing its views, and in fact it was much better for us to express our views than to ignore a subject to which his side ascribed considerable importance. What he was referring to was the need for "delicacy" in such expression. For example, he said that he had always tried to cushion delicate matters by reference to "Country A" and "Country B", etc. He wished we would do the same.

Semenov continued by saying there were "hard heads" on his side, implying both on his Delegation and in Moscow. He said he had "suppressed" more polemical drafts of his own counter statement, but had then been left out on a limb by ours. Warming to the subject, Semenov said that if that was the kind of exchange that was wanted, they could send Roshchin, implying that he (Semenov) wished to reserve himself for more subtle and flexible negotiation.

Semenov concluded by saying that he thought on the whole we had worked out a very good negotiating pattern in SALT, and he simply did not want to see our exchanges divert the Delegations to less fruitful paths.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

2

(Grinevsky, who had been present, later when we were alone referred back to Semenov's comments, saying that Semenov had been very serious in referring to difficulties on their side, and in his reference to leaving grandstand statements to Roshchin.)

The US August 4, 1970 Proposal

I asked why the Soviet side had said that the August 4, 1970 approach was not suitable. Grinevsky immediately replied: "Because it completely ignored FBS". Semenov, however, said that they did not mean that necessarily all aspects of the approach reflected in the US proposal of August 4 were not acceptable, but there were "various aspects", including the complete omission of FBS, which were not satisfactory.

SCC Procedures

Semenov, and separately Grinevsky, complained at length about a quite unnecessary problem we had gotten into over the question of the draft procedure paragraphs for the SCC Regulations. I agreed, but did not think this was a consequence of the US position. I said that the main point simply was that, as agreed in the Memorandum, the SCC itself should establish its Regulations.

Semenov said that he could explain to Moscow the reasons for our proposed change to Article VIII, on confidentiality, but he could not explain to them why the US Delegation insisted on multiple reference to draft and ad referendum status.

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December 19, 1972

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